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Under Color of Law
Siliadin v France and the Dynamics of Enslavement
in Historical Perspective
Rebecca J. Scott

When is it appropriate to apply the term ‘slavery’—a concept that appears to rest on
a property right—to patterns of exploitation in contemporary society, when no
state extends formal recognition to the possibility of the ownership of property in
a human being?1 Historians, who generally position themselves as enemies of
anachronism, may be particularly resistant to the use of an ancient term to describe
a twenty-ﬁrst century reality. And jurists have often been understandably reluctant
to employ a word whose historical meaning was so closely tied to a speciﬁc property
relationship that has long since been abolished in Europe and the Americas.2
The case of Siwa Akofa Siliadin, a young Togolese woman held by a Parisian
family as an involuntary domestic servant from 1995 to 1998, reﬂects this reluctance by courts to reach for the term ‘slavery’ in contemporary cases. Indeed,
although the French court of ﬁrst instance did ﬁnd her exploiters to be guilty of
obtaining unremunerated labor from a ‘vulnerable and dependent person’, that
conviction was overturned upon appeal. Brought to France at the age of ﬁfteen with
a false promise of schooling and immigration assistance, Siliadin had been passed
along to a couple who obliged her to labor as a housemaid and care for children for
more than three years, without pay, ‘from 7.30 a.m. until 10.30 p.m. every day
1 In writing this essay I have beneﬁted from discussions with Malick Ghachem, Allison Gorsuch,
Thomas A. Kelley, Christopher McCrudden, Peter Railton, Scott Shapiro, James Q. Whitman, and
John Witt, as well as the members of the Research Network on the Legal Parameters of Slavery. Juliana
Vengochea Barrios generously shared reference materials compiled for her own research on contemporary slavery. None of these colleagues, of course, should be held responsible for the idiosyncrasies of
my interpretations. The staffs of the University of Michigan Law Library; the National Humanities
Center; the City Archives, New Orleans Public Library; and the Historical Archives of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans, provided crucial assistance in
locating archival and other documentation.
2 In his work, including an essay in this volume, Orlando Patterson argues convincingly from
multinational evidence that slavery as a social practice need not rest on a property right. For the
comparison suggested in the present article, however, between nineteenth-century Louisiana and
twentieth- and twenty-ﬁrst-century France, it is the belief that slavery rests on a property right that is
at issue.

The Legal Understanding of Slavery. Jean Allain.
© Oxford University Press 2012. Published 2012 by Oxford University Press.
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with no days off ’. The couple conﬁscated her passport and generally did not allow
her to leave their apartment except to accompany the children to school and,
‘occasionally and exceptionally’, to attend mass. Living without proper papers,
the young woman believed that she risked jail if she spoke to anyone about her
circumstances.3
The sequence of events illustrates the difﬁculty of adequately characterizing the
offense in question. The Comité contre l’esclavage moderne (Committee Against
Modern Slavery) assisted with the initial ﬁling of a complaint on Siliadin’s behalf.
The Paris Tribunal de Grande Instance found the defendants to have violated
the provision of the Criminal Code that prohibited insufﬁciently remunerating
a person’s labor by taking advantage of ‘that person’s vulnerability or state of
dependence’ (Art. 225–13), but acquitted them on the charge of subjecting a
person in a vulnerable or dependent state to working or living conditions ‘incompatible with human dignity’ (Art. 225–14). The defendants were sentenced to
several months’ imprisonment, a substantial ﬁne, and the payment of damages
to the complainant.4
The defendants appealed, and the Paris Court of Appeal acquitted them of all the
charges, expressing skepticism about the claim of vulnerability, citing the complainant’s ability to speak French and her having accompanied the children to
events outside the home. The prosecutor did not appeal further on the criminal
charges, thus ending that portion of the case, but Ms Siliadin’s lawyers appealed
to the Court of Cassation on the question of damages. The Court of Cassation
quashed the lower court’s decision to acquit on the civil charges, and remitted the
case to the Versailles Tribunal. In 2003, the Versailles court upheld the demand for
compensation on the ﬁrst count, but reiterated that the couple were not guilty of
the imposition of conditions incompatible with human dignity, long hours of work
caring for children being ‘the lot of many mothers’, hence not incompatible with
human dignity when imposed on a domestic worker. Monetary compensation was
later awarded by the Paris industrial tribunal.5
In the end, the French judicial system imposed no criminal penalties on the
perpetrators, and the civil penalties were limited to the provision of back pay due to
the complainant. In 2005, Ms Siliadin appealed to the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR), seeking no further compensation but aiming to gain recognition
that the circumstances under which she had been held, and the failure of the French
state to provide proper judicial remedies, constituted a violation of Article 4 of the
3 Siliadin v France, App no 73316/01 (ECtHR, 28 June 2005). For her own account of her
experience, with some names altered, see Henriette Akofa, with the collaboration of Olivier de Broca,
Une Esclave moderne (Michel Lafon 2000).
4 The sequence is summarized in the ECtHR judgment, cited above. The case was also covered in
the French press, and several newspapers published the name of the couple, Vincent and Yasmina [later
corrected to Aminata] Bardet. See Françoise-Marie Santucci, “Des esclavagistes bon chic, bon genre ;
Libération (Paris, 20 May 1999), at <http://www.liberation.fr/societe/0101282719-des-esclavagistesbon-chic-bon-genre-henriette-travaillait-7-jours-sur-7-de-l-aube-a-la-nuit-sans-salaire-au-tribunal-sespatrons-s-offusquent> (accessed 23 May 2012); and ‘Henriette, Esclave des Temps Modernes’,
Humanité, 19 May 1999.
5 See the summary of these ﬁndings in the ECtHR judgment cited above.
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European Convention on Human Rights. In its decision, the ECtHR rebuked the
French state for having failed to appropriately punish exploitation of this kind, and
thus for having failed to protect Ms Siliadin’s rights under the Convention. The
ECtHR, however, declined to label as slavery the practices to which she had been
subjected, preferring to use the term ‘servitude’. ‘Although the applicant was, in
the instant case, clearly deprived of her personal autonomy, the evidence does not
suggest that she was held in slavery in the proper sense, in other words that Mr and
Mrs B exercised a genuine right of legal ownership over her, thus reducing her to
the status of an “object”’. The Court therefore held that it could not be considered
that Ms Siliadin had been held in slavery ‘in the traditional sense of that concept’,
but did judge that French criminal law had proven inadequate to the task of
imposing an appropriate penalty on those guilty of holding her in ‘servitude’.6
For the purposes of determining the responsibility of the French state, the
distinction between slavery and servitude was not an essential one, since both
practices are prohibited by Article 4 of the Convention, without exception and
without the possibility of derogation. The call for a change in the French criminal
code stood, whichever term was used. As a deﬁnitional matter, however, the
ECtHR’s statement about slavery perpetuated the puzzle: what would constitute
slavery in an urban, domestic context of this kind?7
Several legal scholars have criticized the decisions in Siliadin as ﬂawed in the
Court’s interpretation of the relevant texts, and have observed that international
law is now somewhat fractured on the deﬁnitional point concerning slavery. There
is a notable divergence between the statements by the ECtHR in Siliadin—
seemingly requiring the exercise of a ‘genuine right of legal ownership’ and reduction to the status of an ‘object’ for a ﬁnding of slavery—and those of the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in
Prosecutor v Kunarac, and even of the ECtHR itself in the 2010 decision in Rantsev
v Cyprus and Russia—which both note that it is the ‘exercise of the powers attaching
to the right of ownership’ rather than legal ownership itself that should be held
to be determinative.8
What might a historian add to this debate? A close look at the actual process of
status determination during the period of ‘slavery in the traditional sense of that
concept’, as the ECtHR put it, suggests that the courts in Siliadin were also
mistaken in a key dimension of their historical analysis. The ECtHR’s discussion
of slavery implies that status as a slave rested on a ‘genuine right of legal ownership’.
6

Siliadin (n 3) para 122.
See Holly Cullen, ‘Siliadin v France’, Human Rights Law Review 6 (2006); and Cullen, ‘Contemporary International Legal Norms on Slavery: Problems of Judicial Interpretation and Application’,
Ch 16 in this volume. Jean Allain also called attention to this case in the introduction to his edition of
The Slavery Conventions: The Travaux Préparatoires of the 1926 League of Nations Convention and the
1956 United Nations Convention (Martinus Nijhoff 2008).
8 See Jean Allain, ‘The Deﬁnition of Slavery in International Law’, Howard Law Journal 52 (2009):
239–275 (pointing out that in Kunarac the court observed that the deﬁnition of slavery has expanded
to encompass the exercise of the powers ‘attaching to the right of ownership’, even absent ownership);
Cullen, ‘Siliadin’; and Jean Allain, ‘The Legal Deﬁnition of Slavery into the Twenty-First Century’,
Ch 11 in this volume. Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia, App no 25965/04 (ECtHR, 7 January 2010).
7
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But was a ‘genuine right of legal ownership’ actually a precondition for holding
someone in slavery, even in the nineteenth century? The courts may in fact be using
the wrong metric if they measure contemporary practices against a stereotype,
rather than against an actual set of features of slavery in the past.
One challenge for legal/historical scholarship on this subject is thus to explore
and delimit the concept of enslavement so that it retains a core, historically
grounded meaning, while still enabling us to grasp a dimension of contemporary
reality. A ﬁrst step is to examine the ways in which slave status was determined
during the period when property in human beings was acknowledged in law.
A key to this inquiry is the examination of nineteenth-century cases where illegal
enslavement was alleged, that is, in which a person with a cognizable legal claim to
freedom was reduced to the legal status of a slave. The 1839–1841 drama of the
Amistad captives is perhaps the best-known example. A group of African men,
women, and children who had been transported illegally across the Atlantic rose up
against their captors during a voyage along the coast of Cuba, seized the schooner
Amistad, and eventually came ashore in the United States. Once the US Supreme
Court acknowledged that the alleged owners of the captives had been engaged in
contraband slave trading in violation of international treaties, the claims to ownership of the Africans as ‘slaves’ became unsustainable. This, then, was illegal
enslavement in a world in which legal enslavement remained permissible. The
captives were freed.9
On its own, however, the Amistad case may leave the strong and quite misleading
impression that in nineteenth-century slave societies, if the circumstances of a
person’s enslavement were illegal, the absence of a ‘genuine right of legal ownership’
would mean that the person could no longer be held as a slave. The evidence
suggests that this was by no means the rule. It is now clear that in addition to the
crime of contraband slave trading that ensnared the Amistad captives and many
others, a large-scale enslavement of free persons ‘under color of law’ occurred in
Cuba and in the United States in the early nineteenth century, and was marked by
an outcome that contrasts sharply with the Supreme Court ﬁnding in the Amistad
case. The dynamic of this process of enslavement reveals the disconnect between a
‘genuine right of legal ownership’ and the ‘exercise of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership’. It suggests that we may best avoid anachronism not by
eschewing the use of the term ‘slavery’ to describe the modern exercise of certain
powers over human beings, but instead by examining the interplay of the legal and
the extralegal in both historical and contemporary instances.10
9 It is perhaps not surprising that when ﬁlm director Steven Spielberg sought to draw a modern
audience into the problematics of slavery, he chose to dramatize this episode, in which those held as
captives could in the end see their freedom vindicated under law. For new research on the mechanisms
of the contraband trade by which tens of thousands of illegally enslaved persons were incorporated into
the Cuban plantation economy without any legal recourse, see Michael Zeuske and Orlando García
Martínez, ‘La Amistad de Cuba: Ramón Ferrer, Contrabando de Esclavos, Captividad y Modernidad
Atlántica’, Caribbean Studies 37 (January–June 2009) 97–170.
10 The phrase ‘exercise of . . . the powers’ draws on the language of the 1926 Slavery Convention,
created under the auspices of the League of Nations. See the discussion and citations in Allain, The
Slavery Conventions (n 7).
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A. The Dynamics of Enslavement: Santiago and New Orleans
It was the abolition of slavery in the French Caribbean colony of Saint-Domingue,
now Haiti, that set the stage for the unfolding of this drama. In the course of the
Haitian Revolution of 1791–1803 the holding of property in men and women was
legally extinguished. Free citizens of the polity in which that abolition had taken
place, however, might still ﬁnd themselves at risk of enslavement if they left
its borders. Their circumstances provide us with an early example of a situation
in which the ‘powers attaching to the right of ownership’ might be re-asserted over
those in whom ownership was no longer recognized by law.
Abolition in Saint-Domingue had been achieved as a result of armed challenge
and then legally formalized by the state. In response to the massive uprising of slaves
in the northern plain of Saint-Domingue, and to the threat that the rebels would
ally with an invasion force from adjacent Spanish Santo Domingo, civil commissioners sent by the revolutionary government in France declared slavery ended by
decree in the French colony in 1793. The National Convention in Paris ratiﬁed
that abolition in 1794. When generals Toussaint Louverture and André Rigaud
forced the withdrawal of British occupation troops from portions of the south and
west of Saint-Domingue in 1798, the decrees of abolition could be made effective
throughout the colony. Those who had once been slaves were now free citizens of
France.11
That status came under threat with the ascent to power in France of Napoleon
Bonaparte. Prodded by revanchist émigré planters who denounced abolition itself,
and furious at the autonomy that Toussaint Louverture was managing to achieve
for the colony, First Consul Bonaparte dispatched an expeditionary force to SaintDomingue in 1801 to try to wrest authority away from the black generals who held
power. Bonaparte publicly denied that he would seek to re-institute slavery in the
colony, but his correspondence with his commanders suggests such an intent, and
the conduct of his generals reinforces the impression. The Napoleonic expedition
turned out to be a human catastrophe, bringing ﬁre and war to the countryside and
disease to the troops. The conduct and goals of the expeditionaries made enemies
of nearly the entire population of the colony, and did not succeed in imposing
either Bonaparte’s will or the institution of slavery. More than ﬁfteen thousand
civilians, white and black, sought refuge from the ﬁghting by crossing the Windward Passage to the neighboring colony of Cuba.12
As they crossed from a land without slavery to territories where slavery ﬂourished, some of those on the boats ﬂeeing Saint-Domingue realized that they could
try to assert a claim to ownership over others whom French law had considered to

11 A succinct account of these events is Laurent Dubois, Avengers of the New World: The Story of the
Haitian Revolution (Harvard University Press 2004).
12 On the expedition, see Yves Benot, La Démence colonial sous Napoléon (Éditions La Découverte
2006). On the ﬂight to Cuba see Gabriel Debien, ‘Les colons de Saint-Domingue réfugiés à Cuba
(1793–1815)’, Revista de Indias 13 (October–December 1953): 559–605.
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be their fellow citizens. The possibility of holding property in men and women,
in effect, loomed into view as these boats approached the shores of Santiago de
Cuba and Baracoa. Many men and women who had been freed by the Haitian
Revolution and the French National Convention suddenly risked re-enslavement at
the hands of their fellow refugees or their new hosts.13
Close examination of the circumstances of these refugees raises questions about
the historical assumptions that lie behind the judgment of the European Court in
Siliadin v France. It turns out that in positing a ‘genuine right of legal ownership’
and reduction ‘to the status of an “object”’ as essential features of slavery, the
ECtHR implied a deﬁnition that does not ﬁt the process by which many of the
Saint-Domingue refugees soon found themselves classiﬁed as ‘slaves’. These refugees were subjected to the ‘exercise of powers’ that had previously attached to the
right of ownership, even though any ‘genuine right of ownership’ over them had
been ruptured by abolition. When, six years later, another set of imperial disputes
sent most of the refugees on to Louisiana, the same process would be repeated,
with additional men, women, and children among them being swept into bondage.
In the end, thousands of free citizens of France had been transformed into slaves.
Would-be masters had discovered that by exercising the set of rights seen as
attaching to ownership they could effect enslavement under color of law, quite
independent of whether their claim to ownership was either ‘genuine’ or ‘legal’.

B. The Case of Adélaïde Métayer/Durand
This process of enslavement may best be understood by looking closely at the case
of a speciﬁc refugee who confronted such an effort to assert the ‘powers attaching to
a right of ownership’ over her. The woman later called Adélaïde Métayer had been
born into slavery in the household of a tailor named Charles Métayer, in CapFrançais, Saint-Domingue, around 1780. She was quite young at the time of the
uprising of slaves in the northern plain of the colony, followed by the burning of
Cap-Français in 1793. Her owner and his wife ﬂed, and transported her with them
as a servant (or slave) when they took temporary refuge in New York. Around 1800
the Métayers returned to Saint-Domingue. By then, the legal abolition of slavery
had taken place in the colony. Perhaps by alleging that Adélaïde’s services were
essential to their survival as an aged couple, and thus accessing a loophole in the
regulations governing the new laws, her former master nonetheless managed
to maintain control over her labor for some time.14
13 For a detailed discussion of this migration, see Rebecca J. Scott, ‘Paper Thin: Freedom and Reenslavement in the Diaspora of the Haitian Revolution’, Law and History Review 29:4 (November
2011) 1061–1087; and Ch 3 of Rebecca J. Scott and Jean M. Hébrard, Freedom Papers: An Atlantic
Odyssey in the Age of Emancipation (Harvard University Press 2012).
14 For details on Adélaïde’s background, see Rebecca J. Scott, ‘ “She . . . refuses to deliver up herself
as the slave of your petitioner”: Émigrés, Enslavement, and the 1808 Louisiana Digest of the Civil Laws’.
Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 24 (Spring 2009) 115–136. On the text and provisions of the
various abolition decrees, see [Le G.G.], ‘Documents aux Origines de l’Abolition de l’Esclavage.
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Once back in Saint-Domingue, however, Adélaïde could see that those
around her had left the status of slave, and that she could to do the same. In
1801, she proffered monies to Charles Métayer, and obtained in return a signed
paper acknowledging the payment, releasing her from any obligation to labor, and
recognizing her as free. Adélaïde apparently moved to a nearby town and worked
as a marchande, a trader. But after the Napoleonic expedition landed in the colony
in 1802, she and her young son ﬂed from the renewed warfare on the island, ﬁrst to
Jamaica and then to Baracoa, in Cuba.15
Although some of the Saint-Domingue refugees found themselves reduced to
slavery when they arrived in Cuba, Adélaïde by all accounts lived in Baracoa as a
free woman. She gave birth to two daughters there, each baptized as a free child by
the local parish priest, who inspected the receipt signed by her former owner
and urged Adélaïde and her partner to have it certiﬁed. According to subsequent
testimony of her neighbors, ‘Adélaïde always enjoyed her freedom in Baracoa; she
was very much at ease there’ (‘Adélaïde a toujours joui de sa liberté à Baracoa, elle y
était for[t] a son aise’).16
In 1808, however, Napoleon’s forces marched into Spain, and by 1809 France
and Spain were at war. The Saint-Domingue refugees, as French nationals in a
Spanish colony, were expelled from Cuba. Along with thousands of others, Adélaïde landed with her three children in New Orleans. Head of a household and
apparently conﬁdent of her free status, Adélaïde persuaded those controlling
the disembarkation that she was indeed a femme de couleur libre, a free woman of
color. She and her three children soon settled into lodgings in the city, where she
apparently went by the name Adélaide Métayer.17
At some point in the ﬁrst year after her arrival in New Orleans, Adélaïde Métayer
crossed paths with a man named Louis Noret, who had been the business partner of
her former owner back in Saint-Domingue, Charles Métayer. Noret claimed that
he was owed money by Louis Métayer, the brother of Charles Métayer, and that
Louis was the heir to the property of the now deceased Charles. On this thin thread
of an alleged debt, Noret obtained authorization from the New Orleans City Court
to seize any property of his debtor that he could ﬁnd in New Orleans. Accompanied
by the sheriff, Noret then seized Adélaïde and her three children. The sheriff
promptly advertised the family for sale at auction.18
At the last minute before the scheduled sale, Adélaïde was able to ﬁle suit in
the local court for assault and false imprisonment. This was a standard form for a
Proclamations de Polverel et de Sonthonax, 1793–1794’, Revue d’Histoire des Colonies 37 (1949)
24–55, 348–423.
15 On her itinerary, see Scott, ‘ “She . . . refuses” ’ (n 14).
16 This was the testimony of her neighbor Fillette Galbois, free woman of color, in Transcript of
Record, Peter Métayé v Adélaïde f.w.c., Docket #318, Mss. 106, Historical Archives of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans.
17 For a discussion of the process of attribution of status during disembarkation, see Scott, ‘Paper
Thin’ (n 13).
18 The sequence of events described in this paragraph and in those below is reconstructed from
testimony in the various case ﬁles generated by the legal struggle between Adélaïde Métayer and Louis
Noret. See Scott, ‘ “She . . . refuses” ’ (n 14) and Scott, ‘Paper Thin’ (n 13) for details.
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freedom suit, and her (presumably court-appointed) lawyer succeeded in postponing the sale of Adélaïde and her two daughters while her claim to freedom was
heard. Adélaïde’s older son, however, had apparently been born before the date of
the signature on the receipt for monies she had paid to Charles Métayer back in
1801—a document that was the one written proof she could proffer of her claim
to freedom. The boy was not named in the receipt, and witnesses agreed that
Charles Métayer had for a time retained control over him. There seemed to be no
way to argue that the boy was covered by the document, which Adélaïde’s lawyer
was now characterizing as a freedom paper. The court judged the boy to be a slave
who could be seized as property to cover the debt owed to Noret, and he was sold at
auction on the steps of the Café de la Bourse.19
In theory, Adélaïde’s lawyer could have argued that her seizure and that of all of
her children was an act of illegal enslavement because they had been declared free
under French law in 1793–94. The 1808 Louisiana Digest of the Civil Laws did
hold that legal acts effectuated in another jurisdiction should be interpreted
according to the law in that jurisdiction, so the abolition in Saint-Domingue
was arguably determinative of their status. But it would be highly imprudent for
a woman of color recently arrived from Saint-Domingue to vaunt the general
abolition declared by the Revolutionary Commissioners Léger-Félicité Sonthonax
and Étienne Polverel, legislated by the French National Convention, and subsequently ratiﬁed in the constitution of independent Haiti. Each of these ﬁgures was
generally perceived by white Louisianans as an alarming symbol of revolution and
bloodshed, anathemized by the white Saint-Domingue refugees and by the
governing authorities of the territory of Louisiana. Even a white refugee holding
public ofﬁce in Louisiana, a man whose conduct in that ofﬁce was said to be ‘above
reproach’, was in the process of being disbarred on suspicion of having sided with
the French Republican Commissioner Polverel back in Saint-Domingue ‘in the
year 1793, when the general freedom of the slaves was proclaimed’.20
In 1810, moreover, the implications of an argument based on the French
revolutionary decrees of abolition would have been far-reaching. Although Adélaïde
Métayer had entered New Orleans as a free woman, many of her fellow SaintDomingue refugees of color had been deemed slaves upon their arrival in Louisiana,
based simply on their color, or on the assertion by someone of the powers of
ownership over them. Nearly every one of the persons of African descent from
Saint-Domingue held as a slave in New Orleans—and they numbered more than

19 The announcement of the seizure and offer at auction ﬁrst appeared in the Moniteur de la
Louisiane on 28 April and ran through 23 May 1810.
20 ‘The form and force of acts and written instruments, depend upon the laws and usages of the
places where they are passed or executed’. A Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of
Orleans (1808) (Claitor’s Publishing Division 2008), preliminary title, Ch 4, Art 10. On the
disbarment, see Dormenon’s Case, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 129 WL 841 (La. Terr. Super. Orleans). The
Superior Court of the Territory of Orleans characterized Polverel’s supporters as ‘brigands’. I thank
Fernin Eaton for having pointed out the relevance of Dormenon’s case to that of Adélaïde Métayer.
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three thousand—would have a claim to freedom if the decrees of 1793–94 were
acknowledged as valid. No Louisiana court was going to go down that road.21
The only safe argument for freedom in 1810 was thus an individual one, based in
Adélaïde Métayer’s case on the signed receipt from Charles Métayer. As it turned
out, the court did not have to rule on that claim, because the proceeds from the sale
at auction of Adélaïde’s son covered Noret’s alleged debt. For the moment,
Adélaïde and her daughters were free to return home, because Noret had been
paid. Their legal status remained undetermined, but Adélaïde resumed the social
status of a free woman of color, and as a practical matter no one for the moment
claimed or exercised any of the powers attaching to a right of ownership over her.
She prudently dropped the surname Métayer, presumably to distance herself from
the ties through which Noret had made his claim, and adopted the surname
Durand, under which she baptized her next child.22
Louis Noret, however, was not a man easily deterred. Apparently motivated by
some combination of greed and vengeance, he continued his efforts to turn a claim
of ownership of the family into hard cash. One day in 1816 when Adélaïde was
away from her home, Noret again seized her daughters, along with her newborn
son. This time Noret had obtained a signed power of attorney from Pierre Métayer,
son and heir of Charles Métayer, and hence, Noret argued, the owner of Adélaïde
and by extension her children. Again Adélaïde had to mobilize resources and allies
to try to defend herself against this attempted enslavement, and the case began a
tangled path through the Louisiana courts.23
The Dickensian quality of Adélaïde’s experience, the blatant acts of force by
those who sought to enslave her, and the loss of her son into slavery give this
story a particular poignancy.24 The jarring effect of the scene of the sale of
Adélaïde’s freeborn oldest son is heightened by the thinness of the legal process
by which the tailor Noret had seized the children. At ﬁrst glance one might guess
that the New Orleans courts in 1810 and 1816 simply did not know of the French
revolutionary acts of abolition in 1793–94, and of the evidence that any child born
in Cap-Français, Saint-Domingue, after 1794 was born free. But in fact the judge
in the New Orleans City Court who authorized the sale, Louis Moreau Lislet, knew
the French abolition decrees well. He had himself been a jurist in Saint-Domingue,

21 The material in this paragraph and the two that follow is drawn in part from Scott, ‘Paper Thin’
(n 13).
22 The baptismal act of Luis Durand, 21 April 1816, described as the son of the mulata libre
Adélaida Durand, is in St. Louis Cathedral, New Orleans, Baptisms of Slaves and Free Persons of
Color, 1816–17, vol 1, held in the Archives of the Archdiocese of New Orleans. I thank archivist and
director Emilie Gagnet Leumas for having providing a scan of that record.
23 The six lawsuits involving Adélaïde are enumerated and described in Scott, ‘ “She . . . refuses” ’
(n 14).
24 It has proven impossible to trace the fate of Adélaïde Métayer/Durand’s elder son. A sheriff ’s sale
did not generate the usual notarial record, and once acquired by purchase, an enslaved child would be
unlikely to carry forward a surname in any subsequent written records. I thank Greg Osborn and Irene
Wainwright of the City Archives, Louisiana Collection, New Orleans Public Library, for their patient
assistance as I searched for some record of this sale.
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and several other New Orleans attorneys and judges had also passed through the
French colony during the revolutionary period.25
Nor was this a matter of jurisdiction or conﬂict of laws—Moreau Lislet
was happy to acknowledge the property relations and contractual obligations
from Saint-Domingue that underlay the debt Noret claimed to be owed by the
brother of Métayer, and the ancien régime slave codes that had once conferred a
right of ownership over Adélaïde to Charles Métayer. The judge was implicitly
following the Louisiana Digest of the Civil Laws (which he had helped to draft)
in treating legal arrangements from another jurisdiction as governed by the rules
of that jurisdiction. He was simply unwilling to give any legal force to the decree
that had subsequently abolished those property relations as applied to ownership of
persons.

C. Enslavement as Process
The case of Adélaïde, to whom we should by 1816 grant her chosen surname of
Durand, enables us to re-frame the juridical puzzle of when, exactly, enslavement
may be said to occur. In the enslavement of Adélaïde Durand’s older son we can see
an apparent ‘legal right of ownership’ being brought into being over the person of
a particular child who had been born free. We are watching enslavement itself,
on American soil, in the form of an act of violence that creates the relationship that
law later formalizes, and which is then naturalized into a new status. And it is the
exercise of one of the ‘powers attaching to the right of ownership’—sale at auction—
that causes that right of ownership to appear to be ‘genuine’ and ‘legal’. No prior
legal right of ownership in that child is demonstrated; the presumption of his slave
status (in direct disregard of his free birth) is sufﬁcient.26
The case of this unnamed boy in New Orleans in 1810 and the case of the girl
named Siwa Akofa Siliadin in Paris in 1995–1998 are of course separated by the
great divide that is the nearly worldwide abolition of legal slavery. The core of
abolitionism and of abolition is to denaturalize the relationships on which slavery
had long rested, and to persuade a wide public that the ownership of property in
human beings lacks legitimacy from start to ﬁnish. It was the extraordinary
achievement of the Haitian Revolution to make real that abolitionist possibility
in the heart of the Americas. When war refugees who were former slaves arrived
in Cuba or Louisiana they brought that new reality with them, even if they could
make no open declaration of allegiance to the abolitionist process that had freed
them.27
25 On Moreau Lislet’s time as a jurist in Saint-Domingue, see Alain A. Levasseur, Louis Casimir
Elisabeth Moreau Lislet: Foster Father of Louisiana Civil Law (Louisiana State University Law Center
Publications Institute 1996), pp 79–113.
26 For an examination of the distinction between condition and status, see Allain, ‘The Deﬁnition
of Slavery in International Law’ (n 8).
27 For a subtle discussion of the nature of the example that Haiti provided see Ada Ferrer, ‘Haiti,
Free Soil, and Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic’, American Historical Review (February 2011).
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We are now the heirs of that abolitionism, and that legacy may paradoxically
make it more difﬁcult to perceive slavery once the lines mooring it to a right
of ownership sanctioned by the state have been cut. In the twenty-ﬁrst century
no one can ‘be’ a slave in the strictest nineteenth-century sense of occupying a
legally-recognized status category of person as property. But as Allison Gorsuch’s
study of indentures in Illinois demonstrates, already in the early nineteenth century
the content of slavery could be replicated without the name of slavery, enabling
masters in a ‘free state’ to exercise virtually all of the powers attaching to the right of
ownership over a person. And as the case of Adélaide Durand and her children
suggests, in a slaveholding state the enslavement of a free person could occur in the
absence of any prior ‘genuine right of legal ownership’.28
It is enslavement in this processual sense that modern international agreements
prohibiting slavery seek to prevent. From this wider historical perspective we can
see that the European Court of Human Rights, in grappling with the term ‘slavery’
in its decision in Siliadin, was looking for something it did not in fact need to ﬁnd.
The Court cited the Slavery Convention, and may well have been reaching for a
way to evoke the violations of human dignity inherent in slavery when it spoke of
reduction ‘to the status of an “object”’. But by using the phrases ‘genuine right
of legal ownership’ and ‘the status of an “object”’, the justices set the bar unrealistically high. They seem to have imagined that the legality of the ownership of property
rights in persons in the past—what they took to be slavery ‘in the proper sense’—
had been simple and self-evident, rather than tangled and contradictory. By
implication, they thought they would know a slave if they saw one in antebellum
New Orleans. Hence when they were not sure how to know whether they saw one
in modern Paris, they quickly retreated to what they took to be the more capacious
term ‘servitude’.29

D. Conclusion
When Louis Noret in 1810 propelled Adélaïde Métayer’s son out of her household
and onto the auction block, we can see that he was enslaving a freeborn child.
Modern forms of the exercise of powers that once accrued to the ownership
of human beings as property appear to be radically different from slavery of this
kind, because they are not enforceable by the state. But when a judge looks at an
adolescent held in servitude in a modern metropolis, and wonders whether to call
28 See Allison Mileo Gorsuch, ‘To Indent Oneself: Ownership, Contracts, and Consent in Illinois
Territory’, Ch 7 in this volume.
29 In response to the decision, the French legislature did subsequently amend the Criminal Code,
although it has still not been brought fully into line with Article 4 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. The modest revisions in the language of the Code may make it less likely that
perpetrators will be able to avoid conviction by testifying to their own good intentions vis-à-vis the
victim, but the acquittals in recent cases are not encouraging. See ‘Execution of judgment Siliadin v
France (73316/01): are the general measures satisfying? [updated]’, European Court of Human Rights
News, at <http://echrnews.wordpress.com/2011/03/01/siliadin/> (accessed 23 May 2012).
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what was done to her enslavement, a broader understanding of the relationship of
law to slavery in the nineteenth century may provide some assistance.
There is no reason to measure the predicament of the young woman cooking,
cleaning, and caring for children in a Paris apartment against the circumstances of a
plantation slave in Mississippi in 1850 whose putative owner had both a whip in
hand and a sheaf of bills of sale in his rolltop desk. It may be more useful to
juxtapose the situation of the young woman from Togo to the circumstances of the
son of Adélaïde Métayer, who had lived from birth as a legally free person, but who
was seized one day to be sold at auction. Each would subsequently labor under
compulsion in a stranger’s household, wondering how this had ever come to pass.30
Across the centuries during which slavery was recognized as legal, those who held
others as slaves succeeded in bringing into being a vast body of law that described in
detail the permissible exercise of the powers attaching to the right of ownership. But
the law did not generally see ﬁt to establish a threshold for proving a genuine right
of legal ownership of the person held as a slave, except insofar as ownership might
be contested between two putative masters. It was in the interest of masters for the
status of slave to be easy to impose on a certain category of persons, and almost
impossible to disprove once the deed was done.31
In our own time, the illegality of slavery itself would seem to make challenge to
enslavement more feasible than it was in the early nineteenth century, because the
law no longer explicitly refuses legal personhood to the victims. Circumstance,
friendships, and luck can nonetheless be more important than formal status, just as
they were two hundred years ago. As it turned out, Adélaïde Métayer/Durand
actually won her ﬁnal legal appeal in New Orleans in 1818, establishing her
deﬁnitive juridical freedom by invoking the doctrine of prescripción (prescription)
as it had been codiﬁed in medieval Spanish law. By constantly battling against the
tailor Noret, she had prevented him from exercising the powers attaching to ownership over her, and because her neighbors were willing to testify to her performance of
free status in everyday life, Adélaïde could, after eight years of struggle, win freedom
by virtue of an accumulation of long years lived in good faith ‘as free’.32 However, her
victory only highlights the continuing enslavement of some 3,000 of her fellow
refugees who had been freed by law in Saint-Domingue but made slaves once more
with the change of jurisdiction entailed by their migration to Cuba and then
30 For a full development of the ‘fundamental distinction between the substance of ownership and
the formal recognition of private property rights, countenancing the persistence of the former despite
the eradication of the latter’, see Hickey, Ch 12 of this volume.
31 If one goes back as far as medieval Valencia, one can ﬁnd at least the form of a test for such
legitimacy, because captivity in a ‘just war’ was in theory required for enslavement to be legally rightful.
See Debra Blumenthal, Enemies and Familiars: Slavery and Mastery in Fifteenth-Century Valencia
(Cornell University Press 2009), Chapter 1. By the time of the large-scale enslavement of Africans in
the Americas, such scruples had been jettisoned.
32 Peter Métayer v. Adelaide f.w.c., 6 Mart. (o.s.) 16 (La. 1819). Louisiana had been a Spanish
colony prior to its return to France, just before its acquisition by the United States. In the view of some
jurists, including Pierre Derbigny, who wrote the ﬁnal decision in Adélaïde’s case, Spanish law
remained in effect in Louisiana in those matters in which it had not been superseded by French law,
Louisiana statutes, or US federal law. See the discussions in Scott, ‘ “She . . . refuses” ’ (n 14), and Scott,
‘Paper Thin’ (n 13).
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Louisiana. Without the allies, information, personal histories, and paperwork necessary to hold off those who claimed them as slaves, they were consigned to a situation
that offered no exit.
We need not imagine that there is a single trans-historical meaning to the word
‘slavery’ in order to see the continuing value of the language of the 1926 and 1956
United Nations Conventions. Deﬁning enslavement as the ‘exercise of any or all of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person’, the Conventions
captured key elements of the complex relationship between slavery and law, even
for the epoch of legalized enslavement that seemed to have been closed by the
formal abolitions of the late nineteenth century. Powers that had once attached to
the right of ownership over a person could re-emerge after the end of ‘genuine’ legal
rights of ownership of this kind, whether the termination of an individual’s
enslavement had come within a single lifetime, as it did for the Saint-Domingue
refugees, or within a new international legal regime, as it has in our own era. Several
recent decisions suggest that some judges are indeed moving away from the chimera
of requiring a ‘genuine right of legal ownership’ for a ﬁnding of slavery, and are
invoking the language of the Conventions, with their emphasis on the ‘powers
attaching to the right of ownership’ rather than the right of ownership itself. Under
these circumstances, perhaps the timely appeal of another case may enable the
European Court of Human Rights to replace the ambiguous language of the
Siliadin decision with a clearer historical understanding of what it means to invoke
slavery ‘in the proper sense’.33

33 Christopher McCrudden quotes the language of the English Court of Appeal in R v SK (2011) 2
Cr App R 34: ‘To dismiss “slavery” as being merely reminiscent of an era remote from contemporary
life in the United Kingdom is wrong’. See McCrudden, ‘Slavery and the constitutional role of judges’,
on UK Constitutional Law Group blog, at <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2011/11/02/christophermccrudden-slavery-and-the-constitutional-role-of-judges/> (accessed 23 May 2012). For a general
discussion of the uses of historical evidence concerning slavery in legal argument, see Ariela Gross,
‘When is the Time of Slavery? The History of Slavery in Contemporary Legal and Political Argument’
(2008) 96 California Law Review 283–322.

